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as an important tool of security policy, given the close link­
age between integration and security. There are reasons to 
assume that successful association of the neighbouring 
countries to the EU may produce the same results. In a recent 
report, Stefan Lehne (2014) recommends that the Neigh­
bourhood Policy should expand the ENP framework to more 
countries and that engagement should be more diversified 
according to the needs and capacities of the individual coun­
tries. Further, notes Lehne, there is a need to improve the 
ENP toolbox and develop capacity for rapid reaction, as well 
as developing a more sophisticated approach to promoting 
democratic values; and finally, the EU needs to strengthen 
the  political leadership of the ENP (Lehne 2014). 
If the aim is to integrate the neighbouring countries into a 
broader European security community, I will argue that there 
are at least two conditions that have to be met. First, even 
though full membership cannot be offered, the partner coun­
try must achieve a certain level of integration with the EU. 
Second, the partner country must see the EU as more attrac­
tive than other regional actors. While the EU may have failed 
with regard to Ukraine, it seems to have succeeded in Moldova 
and two countries in the Southern neighbourhood – Tunisia 
and Morocco. While these countries are still far from fully 
integrated into the European security community, they have 
at least embarked on the process towards closer integration.
In a recent NUPI working paper, I make two claims concern­
ing security community building or security governance 
(Rieker 2014). First, that the level of integration with the EU 
is dependent on the following dimensions: the scope of the 
association agreements, the level of adaptation to EU norms 
and rules, and  the level of participation in the EU. And in 
addition, domestic institutions and capacities must facilitate 
rather than obstruct such a process of integration. Second, 
that the attractiveness of the EU is linked to the degree of 
domestic support in the partner country for closer EU inte­
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A region in transition: the need for a revised ENP
The European Neighbourhood is in transition. At the same 
time the EU is struggling with a serious economic crisis. This 
means that internal as well as regional dynamics are chang­
ing. There are threats of instability in many of the neighbour­
ing countries, and today’s EU does not seem to have the right 
tools for dealing with such crises. In the east, the situation in 
Ukraine has become highly worrying; in the south, the war in 
Syria risks destabilizing the whole region. 
As a reaction to the Arab Spring in 2011 the EU did revise 
its neighbourhood policy. The aim was then to move away 
from the earlier top–down approach, to a greater focus on 
support to civil society and the promotion of democracy, and 
to develop more efficient and flexible conditionality based on 
the principle of ‘more for more’. In essence, this approach 
implies more financial support for more reforms. While this 
has also led to a certain increase in the budget, the question 
is if this will be sufficient. And in a new and revised neigh­
bourhood policy, Norway may also have a role to play.
The ENP as an instrument for security community 
building 
The EU has been engaged in promoting democracy, human 
rights, and the rule of law in its eastern and southern neigh­
bourhoods since the 1990s, a process that might be under­
stood as a one of building a security community. This policy 
has been particularly successful for countries with prospects 
of full EU membership, whereas for those without such pros­
pects the results have been mixed. In Ukraine, on the one 
hand, the world is witnessing negative results after a period 
of progress. On the other hand, processes in Moldova, Tuni­
sia and Morocco seem promising. 
The EU still has a role to play in its neighbourhood. There is 
general agreement that the enlargement process has served 
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gration; and that such domestic support, in turn, depends 
on the effectiveness of the ENP and the relative attractiveness 
of this policy compared to what competing actors can offer. 
The effectiveness of the ENP and its implications 
In the working paper referred to above I present a comparative 
examination of four ENP countries – two in the east (Ukraine 
and Moldova) and two in the south (Morocco and Tunisia). 
These four were chosen because they are considered to be the 
most advanced ENP states in each region. Thus, they can be 
seen as being ‘most­likely cases’, and if the ENP is to be con­
sidered as a successful regional security policy instrument, we 
would expect to find positive results in these four countries. 
The empirical analysis is based on four individual case studies 
(Baltag 2014; Batora and Navratil 2014; Bremberg and Rieker 
2014; Dandashly 2014) where the analysis builds on a range 
of national sources with information about the various dimen­
sions of the level of integration and the level of attractiveness 
or domestic support for EU integration. The associ ation agree­
ments and action plans have been important for identifying 
the scope of the cooperation. In addition, the annual progress 
reports prepared by the European Com mission have provided 
central information as regards the level of adaptation and par­
ticipation, as well as various statistics and indexes. Further, 
all authors have conducted interviews with representatives of 
the authorities in the four part ner countries. For an in­depth 
analysis of the individual case studies, I refer to these working 
papers; In this policy brief I restrict the focus to a comparative 
analysis of the EU’s approach to its partners in the East and its 
partners in the south. 
ENP East and ENP South
The European Neighbourhood Policy covers 16 countries – 6 
in the East (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, 
Ukraine) and ten in what has been defined as the South 
(Algeria, Egypt,  Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, the 
Palestinian Authority, Syria, Tunisia). Unsurprisingly, there 
is huge variety in how this policy is implemented. While we 
find differences within each region, the main difference is still 
between the EU’s approach to the East and to the South. This 
is due to geographical and cultural factors, but also to the 
different historical relationships that have existed between 
the EU and its eastern and its southern neighbourhood.
 
While it is difficult to define where the EU’s eastern borders 
should be drawn, this is not disputed in the southern neigh­
bourhood. On the other hand, relations between the EC/EU 
and the countries on the other side of the Mediterranean have 
a longer history, since these relationship started to develop 
already under the Cold War. Moreover, the EU is not really 
challenged in the South by any powerful regional actor, as 
is the case in its Eastern neighbourhood. It is therefore hard 
to say which of the two regions will be more integrated into 
the European security community in the future. This will 
depend not only on the approaches taken by the EU and by 
Russia, but also on domestic factors in the partner countries, 
as clearly shown by recent developments in Ukraine.
However, the fact that it is not obvious where the enlarge­
ment process to the east ends and where the neighbourhood 
policy begins constitutes the main difference between these 
two approaches. While membership is not perceived as a 
future possibility for the partner countries in the South (at 
least not since Morocco’s application for membership was 
turned down in 1987), this is still a long­term ambition for 
most of the partner countries in the East – even though the 
EU has not yet opened up for the possibility of future mem­
bership for any of these countries. There are also disagree­
ments among the current member­states on this issue. In 
practice, this means that, although the EU still is reluctant to 
discuss the possibility of future membership with its Eastern 
partner countries, its approach to the East remains far more 
similar to the enlargement process than does its approach to 
the South. 
As the case studies have shown, the EU has been more strin­
gent in requiring real adaptations to the EU acquis in recent 
negotiations on Association Agreements (AAs) with Moldova 
and Ukraine, whereas a certain degree of alignment to the 
ENP norms seems to suffice in the South. This is why both 
Tunisia and Morocco have had AAs and free trade agree­
ments with the EU since 1998 (Tunisia) and 2000 (Morocco). 
By contrast, Moldova has only recently signed an Associa­
tion Agreement (2013), after a rather cumbersome process. 
Ukraine was on a similar track until the Ukrainian authori­
ties decided to reject a similar agreement. Due to differing 
requirements and expectations, these agreements vary in 
content. Moldova’s AA is far more ambitious, and foresees a 
higher level of integration with the EU than the agreements 
negotiated by Tunisia and Morocco. As argued by Batora and 
Navratil (2014), the primary difference between the EU’s 
Southern and Eastern partners lies in the extensive economic 
convergence and adoption of EU legal and technical stand­
ards in the latter case.
As EU Commissioner for Enlargement and European Neigh­
bourhood Policy, Stefan Füle, stated in an interview with 
Radio Free Europe in May 2013:
The first thing to remember is that the Association 
Agreements on offer for the Eastern Partners do 
not include a path to EU membership – nor do they 
explicitly exclude one. So the deal is not as sweet as 
those offered to the countries in the Western Balkans, 
which received paths to membership, but it offers a 
whole lot more than Association Agreements with 
Morocco and Tunisia, which excluded eventual mem­
bership. It took Croatia 12 years from signing a stabi­
lization and association agreement with Brussels to 
joining the club. Turkey signed its association back in 
1962 and is still waiting.1 
1 http://www.rferl.org/content/eu­association­agreement­ex­
plained/25174247.html  
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Instrument is €15.4 billion for the period 2014–2020, which 
represents a 27% increase compared to the budget of the pre­
vious ENPI instrument.2 
In line with the revised Neighbourhood Policy launched in 
2011, ENI support will focus on the following areas: 
• promoting human rights and the rule of law 
• establishing deep and sustainable democracy and devel­
oping a thriving civil society
• sustainable and inclusive growth, including progressive 
integration in the EU internal market
• mobility and people­to­people contacts, including student 
exchanges 
• regional integration, including Cross­Border Cooperation 
programmes. 
The instrument is also intended to be flexible and follow the 
‘more for more’ principle, whereby the countries that are the 
most willing to undertake reforms in line with ENP norms 
will receive the most. That makes it difficult to foresee how 
the funds will be used and which of the two regions will 
receive more. According to EU Commissioner Stefan Füle and 
Commissioner for Development Andris Piebalgs, the EU will 
…allow for more differentiation and for giving incen­
tives for best performers who genuinely implement 
deep and sustainable democracy, including respect for 
human rights, and agreed reform objectives.3 
It is clear that the EU’s decision to increase the ENP budget, 
as well as the recent revision of its approach, came as the 
direct result of the Arab Spring and therefore indicates the 
EU’s intention to strengthen its neighbourhood policy in the 
South. However, the recent dramatic events in Ukraine may 
spur changes in how the EU perceives its role in the East and 
in the South.
There are security challenges in both regions, not improb­
ably linked to the lack of consolidated democratic institu­
tions. According to the 2013 Freedom House report, all four 
countries are considered as only ‘partly free’ even though all 
except Morocco have established democratic political sys­
tems. As shown in Table 1, Moldova scores highest on politi­
cal rights and civilian liberties, but the differences are not so 
great, even though Moldova has had a democratic system 
ever since 1990.
 
There are indeed differences in the EU’s approach towards 
its Eastern and its Southern neighbourhoods. While the 
approach in the East is more similar to the enlargement 
process, with requirements of adaptation to the acquis, the 
approach towards the South has been a more flexible proc­
ess, supporting and stimulating positive developments and 
requiring alignment rather than acquis adaptation. If we 
sought to evaluate which of these two approaches has been 
more successful as an instrument for security community 
building, the answer would not be self­evident.
Table 1. Freedom, political rights and civilian liberties
Potential and limits of the EU as a security community 
building institution
As recent events have shown, what has been defined as the 
European Neighbourhood has clearly not yet become an 
integrated part of the European security community. This 
is evident in many of the Southern partner countries in the 
aftermath of the Arab Spring, and not least in the East with 
the recent events in Ukraine. 
While the EU has not been the main actor directly involved 
in the domestic revolutionary events in the south or more 
recently in the east, the EU still plays an important role. It 
was also the Ukrainian people’s frustration over the govern­
ment’s decision to finally reject the Association Agreement 
with the EU that led to the protests in the first place. Moreo­
ver, the European Neighbourhood Policy has gained renewed 
attention as a result of these events. However, they have also 
shown that the ENP mechanisms were not set up for deal­
ing with crises. The ENP functions best as an instrument for 
supporting positive processes initiated by domestic forces 
in the partner countries. In this sense, it has the potential to 
contribute to long­term security community building. Inter­
estingly, it seems that the process in the South, with its focus 
on alignment with ENP norms rather than the cumbersome 
process of adaptation to the EU acquis, might prove to be a 
more fruitful approach for countries where national absorp­
tive capacity still is limited – at least while the long­term 
goal is building a security community, not achieving full EU 
membership. 
Possible recommendations for Norway’s linkages to 
ENP
Contributing to a stability and security in the EU’s neigh­
bourhood is important and will continue to be a priority 
in EU foreign policy. As part of the Internal Market and the 
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2 http://www.enpi-info.eu/ENI
3 http://www.enpi-info.eu/medportal/news/latest/35547/Parliament-ap-
proves-new-European-Neighbourhood-Instrument-with-more-than-€15-
billion-in-funding-for-2014-2020
Moldova 
Ukraine
Morocco
Tunisia
Political system
 
Parliamentary democracy 
(since 1990)
Parliamentary democracy 
(since 1991)
Authoritarian monarchy 
characterized by gradual 
political liberalization
Parliamentary democracy 
(since 2011)
Freedom
Partly free 
Partly free
Partly free
Partly free
democracy 
(since 2011)
Political 
rights*
3
4
5
3
Civilian 
liberties*
3
3
4
4
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Schengen agreements, Norway shares a common neighbour­
hood with the EU. Thus, it is also in Norway’s interest to 
contribute to security and stability in these regions. Recent 
events in Ukraine clearly underline how crucial this is for the 
security of all Europe. Combined with the challenges in the 
southern neighbourhood, this is also a policy area that will 
get increased attention from the EU. The ENP has already 
been modified and revised as a result of the Arab Spring. It 
is also likely that it will be revised and adapted further as 
a consequence of the Ukrainian crisis. The Arab Spring led 
to a revision of the policy in order to make it more flexible 
and tailor made to the developments and need of the indi­
vidual countries. This new ENP is clearly more bottom–up 
than the earlier approach, and has a greater focus on how 
developing and strengthening civil society. In addition, the 
EU has proposed a more flexible conditionality instrument 
based on a ‘more for more’ approach, which basically means 
more financial support in return for more reforms. While 
these revisions are important, they are instruments for long-
term conflict prevention. As recent events have shown, the 
ENP also needs an instrument for crisis response and rapid 
reaction. It has also revealed how the (largely Commission­
driven) technocratic and cumbersome approach, focusing on 
adaptation to EU regulations etc., has its limitations, espe­
cially when faced with the more geopolitical approach taken 
by Russia. 
With the EU caught up in a financial crisis, Norway may have 
something to offer the EU as regards strengthening the ENP. 
In return, Norway would benefit from linking to the ENP. It 
might be fruitful to integrate Norwegian development poli­
cies (and regional policies towards the MENA region) with 
the EU dimension in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Consid­
eration should also be given to how Norway might use the 
on­going negotiations concerning the size of EEA grants 
as a way of buying itself into this policy, not necessarily by 
expanding EEA financial mechanism to these countries, but 
rather by contributing financially to the EU policy in some 
way. 
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